This paper analyzes the effect of outbound foreign direct investment (PD!) on the domestic capital stock. The first part of the paper shows that only about 20 percent of the value of assets owned by U.S. affiliates abroad is financed by cross-border flows of capital from the United States. An additional 18 per cent represents retained earnings atiributable to U.S.
The Effects ot Outbound Forei2n Direct Investment on the Domestic Capital Stock Martin Feldstein Foreign direct investment plays an important role in the international transfer of both capital and technology and has a significant impact on the pattern of international trade. The most recent detailed government survey of U.S. direct investment abroad found that in 1989 the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational corporations had assets of more than $1.2 trillion, approximately 25 percent of U.S. gross domestic product in that year.
Companies make direct investments abroad by acquiring existing business assets of foreign companies, by starting new businesses with "greenfield" investments in plant and equipment, and by increasing their investments in foreign businesses that they• already own.
These foreign investments can be either wholly owned by the parent company or owned jointly with foreign partners.' 'The minimum extent of the parent company's ownership share required to make an investment qualify as "direct" rather than portfolio investment depends on the particular definition of foreign direct investment. The common balance of payments definition of foreign direct investment is based on ownership of at least 10 percent of the equity in the foreign business. For some purposes, it is more sensible to concentrate on businesses where the parent has a majority ownership interest. 1 The heterogeneity of foreign direct investment reflects the diversity of motives for making such investments.2 At one extreme, some foreign direct investment (like the purchase of commercial real estate) is not fundamentally different from portfolio investment and the motivation is the standard desire to diversify portfolio assets. A more traditional motivation for PD! is to take advantage of low cost labor or proximity to raw materials. The primary reason is probably to maintain or increase foreign sales and market share. Thus, manufacturing companies that make products for industrial customers invest abroad in order to have closer working relations with customers, especially when their products must be specifically designed or modified for their customers. Many service companies must invest abroad if they want to provide services to those local markets. And some manufacturers acquire foreign firms in order to gain entry into local markets.
Government policies significantly influence the pattern of foreign direct investment, sometimes intentionally and sometimes inadvertently. Some governments require local investment (to create industrial jobs or achieve technology transfers) as a condition of access to government procurement or licensing. Other governments use favorable tax and credit policies to attract foreign investment. In contrast, some governments (e.g., Japan) are notorious for the regulatory barriers that deter inbound foreign direct investment.
The effects of government policies on PD! are not always intended, but may be the inadvertent by-products of policies designed to serve other purposes. Tariffs and other trade 2 See Froot (1993) and Graham and Krugman (1989) and the references cited in those books for a general discussion of foreign direct investment with particular reference to the United States.
barriers intended to protect domestic producers induce inbound foreign direct investment. The taxation of multinational companies can encourage or impede both inbound and outbound foreign direct investment.
There has been a substantial public policy debate about the effects of inbound and outbound foreign direct investment on the domestic economy.3 Much of the public concern is stated in terms of the effect of foreign direct investment on employment, with opponents of outbound FDL arguing that such FDI "takes production abroad" and reduces employment at home while proponents of outbound FDI counter that such FDI creates markets for U.S. exports to affiliates and through affiliates to foreign buyers. Economists recognize that this is a misplaced concern because the American labor market works well in assuring that all who want jobs at wages that reflect their skills can fmd work within a relatively short period of tune. As Graham and Krugman emphasize: "The net impact of FDJ on U.S. employment is approximately zero, and the truth of this assertion has nothing to do with job gains and losses at the industry level." (Graham and Knigman, 1989, p. 49; their italics) . Studies that calculate the numbers of jobs "lost" because particular firms shift activity abroad (e.g., Bergsten et. al., 1978. and Hufbauer and Adler, 1968) do not take into account the absorption of those American workers by other firms and industhes.
A related and more plausible concern is often expressed in terms of the impact of FDI on the "quality" of jobs. The worry is that although the forces of supply and demand maintain total employment, the shift of investment to foreign countries causes a substitution in the United 3See, for example, the discussions in Bergsten et. al. (1978) , Graham and Knigman (1989) and Hufbauer and Adler (1968) .
States of low wage jobs for the higher wage manufacturing jobs that have gone abroad. As a general proposition, this is again incorrect. In a well-functioning labor market like ours, wages reflect the skills of the workers and are therefore not affected by the entry or exit of individual finns. There are some ways, however, in which foreign investment could affect wages. Market imperfections that permit workers in some industries to be paid substantially more than individuals with similar skills in other industries (e.g., union power or the monopoly power of firms that share their monopoly profits with employees) do provide a mechanism by which the mix of firms can affect the distribution of wages. In addition, even without such market imperfections, FDI can affect the quality of jobs if it alters the marginal product of labor. This can happen if FDI changes the domestic capital stock. It can also happen if FDI increases or decreases the kinds of jobs that are more likely to involve substantial on-the-job training.
Training reflects the mix of industries and may be more important in capital intensive industries than in other industries.4
This leads naturally to two questions about the effect of FDI on the capital stocks of both the parent and host countries. First, what impact does an increase in the assets of foreign affiliates have on the parent country's capital stock? Second, what impact does an inflow of foreign direct investment have on the host country's capital stock? The answers to these questions may well depend on the form of the foreign direct investment and on the reason for 4For an extensive discussion of the impact of outbound foreign direct investment on employment in the United States, see Lipsey (1993) . Lipsey concludes that the effect of increased outbound PD! on the domestic employment by multinational companies is probably slightly positive (as outbound FDI increases exports) and that the mix of domestic jobs shifts toward more higher paying technical and managerial positions.
the particular inflow or outflow of such investment.5 Although the available data do not permit such a disaggregated analysis, it is possible to assess the extent to which countries that experience sustained high rates of inbound or outbound foreign direct investment have higher or lower levels of domestic investment than would otherwise be expected. The current swdy focuses on estimating the extent to which outbound foreign direct investment reduces domestic investment in the parent country.
Previous studies of this question have been microeconomic partial equilibrium analyses that have asked whether fkn that invest more abroad reduce their investment at home.6
Although these studies can shed interesting light on the behavior of multinational companies, they do not indicate the net effect on the economy as a whole when individual thns increase their outbound FDI. When finns increase their overseas investment, the funds that they might otherwise have used in the United States might instead finance greater domestic investment by others, leaving both the aggregate capital outflow and the level of domestic investment unchanged. Alternatively, the process of outbound FDI might increase the aggregate net capital outflow and therefore reduce total domestic investment. Resolving the policy debate about the effect of FDI on domestic investment requires resolving this macroeconomic general equilibrium issue. This paper presents information on the general equilibrium effect of foreign direct 5Since foreign direct investment is an endogenous variable in the complex system of trade and capital flows, it would in principle be desirable to estimate a more fully articulated structural model in which one can assess the extent to which changes in exogenous variables that alter FDI influence domestic investment through this route. I return to this issue in section 4 below. investment based on aggregate evidence about investment flows in the OECD countries. The analysis focuses on the effect of outbound foreign direct investment and implies that such investment does reduce domestic investment but that each dollar of assets in foreign affiliates reduces the domestic capital stock by substantially less than a dollar. The best summary of the evidence is that each dollar of assets in foreign affiliates reduces the domestic capital stock by between 20 cents and 40 cents.
Before looking at the basis for these conclusions, it is useful to begin by considering several alternative concepts of foreign direct investment and the relevant magnitude of each for the United States. This is the subject of section one. The second section discusses alternative theories of how outbound foreign domestic investment could affect the domestic capital stock.
Section 3 and 4 present investment equations that are estimated using the OECD data. The implications of this for the displacement question are discussed in the final section. Appendix A presents the basic data used in sections 3 and 4. In the absence of the necessary detail on annual investment flows, I have done so by using the historic cost and current cost values for the total equity of all U.S. foreign direct investment (not just majority owned nonbank affiliates of non-bank parents) that are published 'The restrictions to nonbank firms and to those with majority ownership by the U.S. parent together reduce the measured stock of U.S. owned FDI (according to the balance of payments measure) by approximately 18 percent. All U.S. foreign direct investment had a value (according to the balance of payments measure) in 1989 of $553 billion while the corresponding figure for majority-owned nonbank affiliates was $452 billion. Both figures are estimates of current (1989 dollar) cost values. 8The foreign debt is translated into U.S. dollars at current exchange rates but is not adjusted for changes in value due to changed in interest rates since the debt was issued.
by the Department of Commerce. At yearend 1989, the total value of all U.S. foreign direct investment abroad9 was $553 billion at current cost (1989 dollars) and $370 billion at historic cost (Survey of Current Business.. 1992). Since the debt component of this balance of payments measure of the stock of foreign direct investment was $24 billion, the corresponding equity amounts were $529 billion at current cost and $346 billion at historic cost, a ratio of 1.53.
Despite the obvious limitations of using a single ratio for both initial equity investments and subsequent retained earnings, this ratio will be used to adjust all historic cost equity values in This is the "balance of payments" measure of foreign direct investment. It is the sum of the initial equity investments of U.S. parents, the subsequent retained earnings and any net debt from U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates.
'°The historic cost number reported in the 1989 Benchmark Survey (Table III. C. 1) is $132 billion. Multiplying this by the factor 1.53 produces the current cost estimate of $202 billion.
The gross debt from U.S. parents to their foreign affiliates was $84 billion. This was offset in large part by $59 billion of credit from affiliates to parents, leaving a net debt of affiliates to parents of $25 billion. The balance of payments measure of foreign direct investment includes oily the net debt and I follow that procedure in the current analysis. The external finance from U.S. sources is substantially augmented by equity and debt from foreign sources. Even among these affiliates that are majority owned by their U.S.
parents, foreign sources invested equity of $92 billion at current cost'3 and foreign creditors provided $567 billio&4. This current dollar figure is based on the historic cost value of $60 billion.
The 1989 Benchmark Survey reports that the total liabilities of the majority-owned nonbank affiliates of nonbank U.S. parents was $673 billion. This included current liability and long-term debt of $562 billion and "Other liabilities" (including deferred taxes of the subsidiary) of $111 billion. Subtracting the $106 billion of gross debt provided by U.S. parents and other U.S. sources (i.e., the sum of $25 billion of net debt from parents, $59 billion of offsettingdebt from affiliates to parents that is counted as part of the gross debt of the affiliates, and $22 billion of debt from other U.S. sources) leaves a balance of $567 billion of debt supplied by foreign With these building blocks, it is possible to define three progressively broader concepts of outhound foreign direct investment. The first is the Net External Finance from U.S. Sources.
This is the sum of I and 2 above or $250 billion.
The second measure of U.S. foreign direct investment adds the value of the retained earnings of foreign affiliates attributable to U.S. investors (the sum of 4a and 4b or $226 billion)
to the net external finance from U.S. parents and other U.S. sources. This Net Finance from U.S. Sources13 had a value of $476 billion.
The third natural definition is the value of the assets in the foreign affiliate, regardless of who finances those assets and of whether the finance is by debt or equity. This definition.
the Value of Assets of U.S. Foreign Affiliates, is the sum of the four building blocks or $1,237
billion.
The three concepts and the associated magnitudes are shown in Table 1 .
"This exceeds the Official Balance of Payments definition of the stock of U.S. foreign investment by including the value of the equity and debt of U.S. investors and creditors who are not parents of the foreign affiliates.
2.
The Displacement Effect of Outbound Direct investment: Partial Ecuilibrium VS. General EQuilibrium Analysis 1-low does the decision of an American firm to invest abroad in a foreign subsidiary affect the total amount of investment in the United States? Despite the widespread interest in this question, there has been no formal analysis or empirical investigation of the general equilibrium effect of outbound FDI on domestic investment.
2.1
The Behavior of Individual Finns
The common popular discussion of this issue treats it as a partial equilibrium question of where corporate production will occur. As noted above, opponents of outbound FDI argue that such investment reduces domestic production by substituting for exports while defenders of outbound FDI argue that overseas subsidiaries increase the market for U.S. exports and therefore increase production in the United States. There are undoubtedly examples of both possibilities in actual practice. These countervailing effects may explain why the very careful study of individual multinational firms by Stevens and Lipsey (1988) failed to find any significant effects of overseas production on domestic exports and investment. 16 An alternative partial equilibrium analysis would start with the corporate financial decisions and ask whether a firm that invests more abroad will invest less at home. In the simplest textbook version of the investment decision, the firm can borrow as much as it wants at a fixed interest rate and therefore invests until the marginal product of capital equals that rate 16 Similar evidence that outbound FDI is not associated with export displacement is reported in Blomstrom et. al. (1988) and in Lipsey and Weiss (1981, 1984 ).
•11 Actual corporate experience is very far from these textbook models. The following simplified version of corporate capital budgeting shows how a firm's decision to invest abroad could reduce its domestic investment. In this view, the company starts with a fixed amount of after tax profits and a dividend payout that its shareholders expect. 'There is some but very little room to vary dividends from the expected amount. The combination of the retained earnings (after this dividend payout) and the company's desired debt to capital ratio determines the amount that the company can borrow and therefore the firm's total funds available for capital investments.'7 Since this capital budget calculation is done for the multinational corporation as a whole rather than for individual subsidiaries, the result is a capital budget for the entire corporation. Any use of that capital abroad reduces the amount of capital available for domestic investment within the firm.'8
However, as the analysis of section 1 indicated, much of the capital invested in U.S.
affiliates overseas is raised abroad. it is clear that the share of foreign-source debt and equity in the U.S foreign affiliates is far greater than the share of such foreign-source debt and equity in the financing of the domestic U.S. industry. This reflects the fact that most American firms "The company could of course modify this by new equity issues, share repurchases, and divestiwres but these should be seen as unusual events rather than as part of the annual capital budgeting process. Stevens and Lipsey-(1988) -investigate the financial interdependence between foreign investment and domestic investment over time in a sample of U.S. multinational firms and find that overseas investment does reduce domestic investment through this channel. Their formal model lies between the two extremes described in the current text: finns do not have a fixed debt-to-capital ratio but the cost of funds is a function of that ratio.
are more likely to borrow abroad to fmance overseas assets than to finance domestic assets. The reason for this is unclear. It may reflect a desire to hedge foreign currency profits with foreign currency debt, an ability to borrow morecheaply when collateral is available, or other aspects of the risk and return of tbancthg behavior. This segmentation of borrowing may be a form of suboptimal behavior similar to the widely observed failure of portfolio managers to diversify investment.
Similarly, American firms are more likely to seek foreign joint venture partners for overseas subsidiaries (in order to get market access or other benefits of having a local partner) than they are to seek such equity investors here in the United States. The foreign equity investor is also likely to regard such direct investment as a joint venture partner within its own country as less risky than investing in the United States.
In short, even if outbound FIN substitutes for other investments within the firm's capital budget, more of the funds to fmance that outbound FDI are likely to come from foreign sources than would be the case for domestic investment.
Macroeconomic General Euuilibrium Effects
To assess the net impact of outbound FDI on total investment in the United States it is important to look beyond the partial equilibrium analysis of individual firms. The net impact of outbound FDI depends on the extent to which that outbound FIN changes the aggregate net outflow of capital from the United States, including net portfolio investment as well as net direct investment.
In a world of perfect capital mobility in which the total pool of world savings moves to finance those investments with the highest risk-adjusted rates of return, an increase in U.S.
direct investment abroad need not have any effect on the U.S. capital stock. Funds would automatically flow in to finance domestic U.S. investments that earn the required rate of return.
But although the integration of global capital markets appears to be increasing, we are still a long way from the textbook model of perfect capital market integration. Gross international capital flows are large, but sustained net flows are relatively small. As Charles
Horioka and I showed nearly 15 years ago (Feldstein and Horioka. 1980 ), a nation's savings tend to be invested in the country where they originate The "saving retention coefficient"
(the fraction of a marginal dollar of saving that is invested domestically) is estimated to be between 0.8 and 0.9 on average for the OECI) countries. This is dramatically different from the world of perfect capital mobility in which a nation's rate of investment would not depend on its saving rate and therefore in which the saving retention coefficient would be zero.
Paradoxically, the extreme no-net-capital-flow case (a saving retention coefficient of 1.0 that is uninfluenced by the volume of outbound or inbound FDI) has the same implication in the current context as the perfect capital mobility case: an outflow of direct investment does not change the amount of net domestic investment. Any net outflow of FDI in this case would be offset by a reduction in outbound portfolio investment or an increase in inbound portfolio investment. The previous estimates of the Feldstein-Horioka type investment-saving equations did not explicitly test whether the amount of domestic investment is influenced by the outbound or inbound F1)I. That is the subject of the next two sections.
19 This fact has since been replicated many times. See Frankel (1992) and Mussa and Goldstein (1993) for discussions of this literature and comments on the reasons why savings remain at home even in a world capital market that appears to be quite closely linked and very active. See also Baxter and Crucini (1993) and Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) .
A more likely possibility is that the Feldstein-Horioka relation relates to portfolio investment rather than to direct investment. In the extreme case, an extra dollar of national saving would remain in domestic portfolio assets unless it is used by a multinational corporation to finance a cross-border direct investment. Such an outbound FDI would reduce the funds available for domestic investment by an equal amount, as the above corporate budget example suggests. If the portfolio investments were completely segmented into national markets in this way, the effect of the outbound FDI on domestically available funds would not be offset by any international flow of portfolio capital and the aggregate domestic investment would be reduced by the full amount of the direct investment outflow.
The evidence in the next two sections support the idea that foreign direct investment transfers capital across borders with very little offsetting net portfolio investment. More specifically, the evidence indicates that each dollar of outbound FDI reduces domestic investment by approximately one dollar.
Estimates of the Effects of FDI on Domestic Investment
The estimates presented in this section are an extension of earlier work reported in a number of papers beginning with Feldstein and Horioka (1980) •W The basic Feldstein-Horioka specification relates the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP to the ratio of gross national saving to GDP. Since these ratios are calculated as decade averages, the analysis relates to sustained differences among countries rather than year to year changes. The specification assumes that the national differences in saving determine national differences in investment 20 See Frankel (1992) and Mussa and Goldstein (1993) for summaries of this literature.
rather than the reverse. Since these specification issues have been discussed extensively in previous articles2t, I will not comment on them here.
The innovation in the current study is to add data on inbound and outboundFDI to the previous bivariate specification. The simplest form of the resulting equation is:
where GD! is gross domestic investment, GNS is gross national saving, GD? is gross domestic product, the two types of PD! are denoted FDI-out and FDI-in, and u is a stochastic disturbance. The individual variables in the numerator and denominator foreign affiliates, not just majority owned or nonbank affiliates. These data are not ideal but they are the best data available for this study.
Although the OECD produces consistent data on GD!. GNS and GDP, there are no 2l5 Feldstein (1983) and Feldstein and Bachetta (1991) as well as the references cited in the previous footnote.
yofficial OECD data on Fl)!. The data on FDI come from the International Monetary FunF.
The limited availability of data on P01 restricts the sample to 18 of the 24 OECD countries for the decade of the 1980s and 15 of those countries for the decade of the 1970s. This section presents separate results for both samples as well as for a pooled sample of 33 observations.
For all of these countries it is possible to obtain estimates of PD! excluding retained earnings (RE) . It is also possible to obtain the amount of retained earnings of these foreign affiliates for nine of the countries during the decade of the 1970s and ten of the countries during the decade of the 1980s. Estimates are also presented for these smaller samples.
The first three equations presented in Table 2 It would of course be desirable to distinguish the response of domestic investment to outbound cross-border FDI flows from the response of domestic investment to the retained earnings of the foreign affiliates. Unfortunately, there are too few observations to make such an estimate. Attempts to use the samples corresponding to equations 7 through 9 to look at the retained earnings variable separately (in addition to the other variables already in those equations) results in almost no residual degrees of freedom and therefore to very unstable coefficient estimates with very large standard errors. it is not possible to determine statistically whether a one dollar increase in GNS due to an increase in the RE of foreign affiliates has the same impact on GD! as a one dollar rise in GNS due to domestic savings.2' Similarly, when outbound FM is defined to include the retained earnings of foreign affiliates (equations 7 through 9) it is not clear whether the reaction to the cross-border FM flow is the same as the Recall that gross national saving includes the retained earnings of foreign affiliates. The column marked RE indicates whether the FDI variables include or exclude the retained earnings of the foreign affiliates.
reaction to FDJ-out that is achieved without a cross-border flow by an increase in the retained earnings of the affiliate.
The reaction of domestic home country investment to a dollar of dividends that is repatriated by the subsidiary to the parent company is ambiguous a priori as well. Although the direct effect of the dividend repatriation would be to add to the domestic capital stock, this could be offset to the extent that the dividend induces a reduction in inbound portfolio investment or an increase in outbound direct or portfolio investment. Since the econometric evidence cannot resolve this ambiguity, section 5 examines the implications of the two alternative extreme assumptions that subsidiary retained earnings reduce domestic (home country) investment dollarfor-dollar and, alternatively, that they do not affect domestic investment at all.
4.
Additional Variables and Simultaneity Problems
The interpretation of the coefficients in Table 2 is clouded by the fact that the saving rate and the two FDI ratios are endogenous variables in the overall economic system. In particular, the levels of inbound and outbound FDI are likely to be correlated with variables that favor higher domestic rates of investment. A country that offers a Rgood environment" for domestic investment is also likely to attract more inbound PD! and may also experience less outbound FDI. This section shows that this problem of missing variables does indeed bias the coefficients shown in section 3. increasing the absolute size of both the FDI-out and FDI-in coefficients.
The results in this section are thus quite different from the earlier studies of potential bias in the estimated savings retention coefficient in the simpler Feldstein-Horioka specification.
Since it is certainly possible that some of the same factors that cause a countiy to have a higher saving rate might also cause it to have a higher investment rate, Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991) also estimated the basic specification by an instnnnental variable estimation procedure using demographic characteristics and social security variables as instruments for the national saving rate. Although the relatively small sample of fewer than two dozen countries limits the relevance of the consistency property of IV estimation, the similarity of the OLS and IV estimates provides some reassurance that the potential endogeneity of the savings rate is not a source of significant bias. Further support for the assumption that long-term intercountry differences in saving cause long-term differences in investment (rather than the reverse or a simultaneous equations relation) is obtained by dividing national saving into private saving and government saving and noting that both components of national saving have essentially the same effect on domestic investment in a generalized Feldstein-llorioka specification (Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1991) .
Although it would be desirable to re-estimate the equations in Table 2 using an instrumental variable approach, I have been unable to find any variables that would be satisfactory instruments. I decided therefore to pursue a different approach to reducing the possible bias in the estimated FDI coefficients by expanding the specification of the investment equation to include additional determinants of investment that might also be correlated with either or both of the FIN variables. Although some bias might remain even in this specification because not all possible variables are included, this method is preferable to using an instrumental variable estimation procedure with a very small sample and very inadequate instruments. Table 3 summarizes the results of these more general specifications. The evidence confirms that outbound FDI does reduce domestic investment but the coefficients are now absolutely smaller, indicating that the previously omitted variables were common factors that affected FDI-out and GD! in similar ways.24
For example, equation 1 of Table 3 (which is estimated for the pooled sample of 33 country-decade observations) includes four variables in addition to the saving rate and FIN variables: (1) a dummy variable indicating whether the country is in Europe (E); (2) The next four equations in Table 3 Table 2 , it seems most appropriate to conclude that each dollar of cross-border FDI-out reduces domestic investment by approximately one dollar.
The FDI variables reported in equations 1 through 6 of Table 3 The results are shown in equations 7, 8 and 9. The first two of these repeat the two specifications of equations 1 through 6 while equation 9 is the specification with the highest adjusted R2 when the FDI variables are defined to include retained earnings.
The coefficients are similar in all three specifications. The estimated effect of FDI-out is slightly larger in absolute size than in the pooled estimates of equations 1 and 2 but, given the small sample and large standard errors, is not significantly different from -1.0. The major difference from the other equations in Table 3 is that the coefficient of the FDI-in variable rises to approximately 1.0 and becomes nearly twice its standard error. This implies that the retained earnings of foreign affiliates in a given host country, like other forms of domestic saving in that country, increases domestic investment in that host country. More generally, the evidence in this section implies that outflows of foreign direct investment reduce domestic investment on a dollar-for-dollar basis and that this reduction is not offset by an international shift in portfolio investment. This is consistent with a view that the Feldstein-Iiorioka segmentation ofcapital markets applies to portfolio investment and that direct investment circumvents this barrier to capital mobility. Similarly, foreign direct investment induces U.S. firms to use much more foreign debt and equity finance in their majority owned foreign affiliates than they would use for domestic investments. In that way, the financing of FDI also makes available the advantages of foreign portfolio financing in a way that would not occur without the direct investment.
5.
The States. Of the remainder, 1$ cents comes from the U.S. share of retained earnings of the foreign affiliate and 62 cents comes from foreign debt and equity sources.
Before considering the implication of this avenge financing mix, I will consider two The analysis of section 1 shows that the retained earnings attributable to U.S. investors (corresponding to s in the current calculation) were $226 billion in 1989, that the retained earnings attributable to foreign investors was $102 billion, and that the debt from foreign sources was $567 billion. If the relative magnitudes of these three financing sources are used to approximate the financing of the leveraged retained earnings investment, we obtain 5 = 226/895 = 0.25. With these assumptions, an additional dollar of foreign affiliate capital financed with leveraged retained earnings reduces the U.S. capital stock by 25 cents. This is an upper limit of the plausible range because it is based on the assumption that any retained earnings that are not invested by the foreign subsidiary would otherwise add dollar-for-dollar to the U.S. capital stock.
Average Financing
The observed aggregate financing mix described in section 1 reflects both new equity and debt transfers from parents to affiliates and the subsequent reinvestment of retained earnings.
Both types of investments are leveraged with foreign debt. While individual investments will use different financing mixes, the overall financing mix may remain relatively unchanged if the mix of new investment and reinvestment continues to be about the same.25
To analyze this overall average financing case, the three sources of financing identified in the "leveraged retained earnings case" must be expanded to include e -the external equity capital provided by the U.S. parent and other U.S. investors e -the external equity capital provided by non-U.S. sources b -the debt supplied by the U.S. parent and other U.S. creditors
Now e e* + b + b* + a + s = 1.
The econometric results of section 3 and 4 imply that each dollar of cross border equity and debt (e and b in the current notation) reduces domestic investment by one dollar. If we assume also that each dollar of foreign subsidiary retained earnings that is not invested in the affiliate would otherwise be repatriated and would add dollar-for-dollar to domestic investment in the United States, an additional dollar of foreign affiliate capital financed with the observed average mix of financing sources would reduce the U.S. capital stock by e + b + s < 1 dollars. Once again this is an upper limit because the repatriation of subsidiary retained earnings may not increase domestic investment dollar for dollar.
It would be desirable to compare the composition of financing of U.S. foreign affiliates in the 1989 benchmark survey with the financing composition in earlier studies. the U.S. government and a foreign government but only the former remains a part of U.S. national income. An evaluation of whether the outbound U.S. FDI increases or decreases U.S. national income requires balancing the tax losses to foreign governments against the advantage of the increased use of foreign source capital that accompanies foreign direct investment. That analysis is the subject of a separate study (Feldstein, 1994 
